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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Judgments-Executions-Statute of Limitations
On December 22, 1932, P, trustee under a w*ill, recovered a judgment by confession against V. B. Drake, and his wife, in the amount
of $13,307.83. No action was taken on this judgment until September 30, 1942, when execution was issued thereon at the instance of P.
Pursuant thereto the homestead exemption allotted Drake's wife was
confirined, but as a result the execution was returned "for lack of
time in which to advertise." On October 21, 1942, execution returnable on December 21 was issued. By virtue of this execution the land
was -duly advertised and sold on November 24, 1942. P, as at all subsequent sales, was the last and highest bidder. On December 4 the bid
was raised and, as required by statute,1 the Superior Court Clerk rejected P's bid and ordered the sheriff to reopen the sale, readvertise,
2N.
C. CODE Axx. (Michic, 1939) §2591.
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and resell the property. This resale was had on December 22, the
day on. which the ten-year period of limitations ran against the judgment. The bid was raised on the same day. On December 24 execution was again issued, the property was duly advertised, and the sale
was held on January 11, 1943. As in the case of the prior sales, the
bid was raised and the fourth and last sale was had on February 9.
On February 19, no one having raised the highest bid made at the last
sale, the defendants moved for an order recalling the execution issued
on December 24, 1942, "and to quash same and the other proceedings
thereunder for that .

.

. said execution was issued more than ten years

after the date of the rendition of the judgment confessed by the defendants. . .

."

This motion was denied by the trial court, and the

defendants appealed. Held, reversed.2
The pivotal question presented by the case at hand is this: Where
execution is issued on a judgment, and the sale is had within ten years
after the rendition of said judgment, but the bid is raised and successive resales are ordered as required by statute, with the result that
the final sale takes place on a date after the expiration of said ten
years, do the execution, sale, and subsequent orders made before the
expiration of the ten years have the effect of prolonging the statutory
3
life of the lien of the judgment within the meaning of our statute?
The Court answered this question in the negative, holding that the
lien ceased to exist as soon as the ten-year period expired on December
22, 1942, with the result that all proceedings thereafter were of no
effect since they were barred by the statute of limitations. This conclusion was reached on the theory that the execution and sale failed
to bring the case within the saving clause of the statute which provides thus: "But the time during which the party recovering or owning
such judgment shall be, or shall have been, restrained from proceeding
thereon by order of injunction, or other court order, or by the operation of any appeal, or by a statutory prohibition does not constitute
any part of the ten years aforesaid. . .. '4 In holding that the execution and sale did not suspend the running of the statute the court relied
on several North Carolina cases.5 It is interesting to note that in none
of these cases was there both an execution and a sale before the statute
6
bad run. *
- Cheshire v. Drake, 223 N. C. 577, 27 S. E. (2d) 627 (1943).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §614.
' Ibid.
'Lupton v. Edmundson, 220 N. C. 188, 16 S. E. (2d) 840 (1941) ; Hyman v.
Jones, 205 N. C. 266, 171 S. E. 103 (1933); Barnes v. Fort, 169 N. C. 431, 86
S. E. 340 (1915) ; Spicer v. Gambill, 93 N. C. 378 (1885).
**The court apparently cited these four cases under the mistaken belief that
they were in point and therefore controlling. An examination of the facts of
these cases, briefly stated, and the holdings therein shows them to be readily
distinguishable from Cheshire v. Drake. (1) Lupton v. Edmundson, 220 N. C.
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So far as we have been able to discover this is the first case decided
by our Court in which the execution was issued and the sale held
before action on the judgment became barred by the statute of limitations. In fact, this case could not have arisen before 1933 because it
was not until then that our statute on judicial sales was amended to
allow upset bids in the case of a sale of property under execution. 7*
There is no quarrel with the general proposition that issuance of execution alone will not lengthen the statutory period. This attitude has
been frequently expressed by our Court.8 However, the forcefulness
of the argument on which this attitude rests is somewhat weakened by
the fact that it has most frequently appeared as dicta.9 Also, other
188, 16 S. E. (2d) 840 (1941). P's assignor recovered a judgment against
D on August 20, 1930. An action to enforce the lien of the judgment by condemning and selling the land was begun on August 14, 1940. The Court held
that the action was barred because the sale of the land could not be made and
concluded within the ten-year period. (2) Hyman v. Jones, 205 N. C. 266, 171
S. E. 103 (1933). A judgment charging owelty in a partition proceeding was
rendered January 31, 1923. Execution was issued January 16, 1933, but the sale
was not held until March 6, 1933. On the basis of Smith, ex parte, 134 N. C.
495, 47 S. E. 16 (1904) the Court held "that the issuing of an execution on a
decree charging owelty in partition is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations." It is indeed interesting to note that in Smith, ex parte, at page 501, the
Court phrased this question: "Does the word 'action,' which is used in the statute
[Statute of Limitations] include .. a motion for leave to issue execution upon
a judgment charging land with the payment of money for equality of partition?"
and answered it in the affirmative. However, the Court denied the motion for
leave to issue execution because some twenty-five years had elapsed since the right
of action on the judgment accrued. The dicta in these two cases seems irreconcilable to this writer, even though the same result was reached in both cases.
(3) Barnes v. Fort, 169 N. C. 431, 86 S.E. 340 (1915). In this case two judgments were rendered, one on December 23, 1898, the other on April 16, 1900.
In an action on these judgments in 1911 the Court held them to be barred by the
statute of limitations. (4) Spicer v. Gambill, 93 N. C. 378 (1885). A judgment
was recovered at the April 10 term of court, 1870. Leave to issue execution was
obtained March 3, 1880, and execution duly issued April 14, 1880. The sale was
held August 2, 1880. In an action to nullify the sale the Court held that the sale
was ineffective as barred by the statute of limitations. In a dictum appearing on
page 383 the Court said that "to preserve the judgment lien the process to enforce and render it effectual must be completed by sale within the prescribed time
(ten years)," and "if delayed beyond these limits unless interrupted in the manner pointed out in Section 435 of the Code (now C. S.614) the lien is gone."
7*

N. C. CODE ANX.

(Michie, 1939) §2591, which provides for upset bids and

the subsequent procedure, was not applicable to sales under execution until it
was amended by the Legislature. N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 482, brought sales of
real property under execution within the provisions of this Section.
'Lupton v. Edmundson, 220 N. C. 188, 16 S.E. (2d) 840 (1941) ; Osborne v.
Bd. of Education of Guilford Co., 207 N. C. 503, 177 S. E. 642 (1934) ; Hyman
v. Jones, 205 N. C. 266, 171 S.E. 103 (1933).
'Old Dominion Pants Co. v. Mewborn, 172 N. C. 332, 90 S. E. 311 (1916)
Barnes v. Fort, 169 N. C. 431, 86 S.E. 340 (1915) ; Smith, ex parte, 134 N. C.
495, 47 S.E. 16 (1904) ; Evans v. Aldridge, 133 N. C. 378, 45 S.E. 772 (1903) ,
King v. Powell, 131 N. C. 826, 43 S.E. 1006 (1902) ; Harrington v. Hatton, 130
N. C. 89, 40 S. E. 848 (1902); Pipkin v. Adams, 114 N. C. 201, 19 S. E. 105
(1894); Lytle v. Lytle, 94 N. C. 683 (1886); Spicer v. Gambill, 93 N. C. 378
(1885) ; Berry v. Corpening, 90 N. C. 395 (1884) ; Williams v. Mullis, 87 N. C.
159 (1882) ; Fox v. Kline, 85 N. C. 173 (1881) ; Pasour v. Rhyne, 85 N. C. 149
(1881) ; Lyon v.Russ, 84 N. C. 588 (1881).
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jurisdictions seem to have held that the issuance of execution will toll
the statute,' 0 and several states have adopted statutes which the courts
have construed as meaning that execution on a judgment will either
suspend the statute or start a new statutory period."1 An examination
of the North Carolina cases related to this problem dicloses, as already
indicated, that they are distinguishable from the one under consideration.l 2* Therefore, it is urged that the Court should not have relied
on them as controlling in deciding the instant case. On the contrary,
it is submitted that the holding should have been that the statute was
suspended by the first execution and sale, and that therefore the proceedings after December 22, 1942, were not barred and were thus
valid. Such a conclusion would not have been without adequate support and the hardship worked by the present decision would have
been avoided.
Clearly the purpose of the statutes of limitations would not be defeated by such a holding. Being statutes of repose, their purpose is to
prevent the litigation of stale claims by requiring patties who have
rights of action to take some steps to enforce these rights within a prescribed time, or forever lose them. That such is the purpose of these
statutes is evidenced by the fact that once the party possessing the
right has taken some affirmative action to enforce it the applicable
statute of limitations is suspended.' 3 This judicial attitude is based on
the theory that once the wheels of legal machinery are put in motion
the need for the statute is no longer present, for the possibility of the
claim becoming stale is thereby resolved.
Our statutes require that an action upon a judgment must be commenced within ten years. 1 4 Can it be validly argued that the judgment
creditor in the case under observation did not commence an action on
his judgment within ten years? By issuance of execution and the sale
thereunder he not only adopted the statutory process provided for the
enforcement of a judgment,' 5 but he adopted the only available means
of collecting his claim. He thereby employed legal machinery to satisfy

"0Thatcher v. Lyons, 70 Vt. 438, Atl. 428 (1898); see Shields v. Stark, 51
S. E. 540 (Ct. of Civil App., Tex., 1899); Note (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 661.
1 Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S. W. 686 (1918) ; Morgan v. Lewis,
172 Ky. 813, 189 S. W. 1118 (1916); Davis v. Roller, 106 Va. 46, 55 S. E. 4
(1906); cf. Orndorff v. State, 108 S. W. (2d) 206 (Ct. of Civil App., Tex.,
1937). Contra: McGraw v. Mitchell, 142 Miss. 357, 107 So. 423 (1926).
1"* See note 6, supra, where the cases relied on by the Court in the instant
case are distinguished from it. For a further comparison of prior North Carolina cases with Cheshire v. Drake examine the cases collected in notes 8 and 9,
supra.
23 Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N. C. 725, 18 S. E. (2d) 436, 138
A. L. R. 1438 (1941) ; Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936);
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROC. (1929), §105; 34 Am. JUR.
(1941), Limitation of Actions, §§237, 247.
14 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§437, 438.
15

N. C.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1939) §663.
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his claim just as effectively and completely as one issuing summons
against a party defendant; and it is universally held that the placing
of a summons in the hands of the proper official for service will suspend
the statute, even though it is not actually served until after the statutory period has run.16 It is admitted that our court has been in accord
with the majority view in strictly construing the statute of limitations. 17
However, it is worthwhile to note that the judicial attitude toward such
statutes is much more favorable than when they first appeared, and the
present trend is to construe limitation laws liberally.18
The decision in the case before us calls attention to the inequity of
an unduly strict construction of the statute, as contrasted with the
justice and propriety of a reasonably liberal construction, which would
have in no way reduced the effectiveness or value of the statute. P
began his action in ample time to afford a consummation of the sale
by execution and delivery of a deed before the ten-year period lapsed.
Is it proper that he should suffer because a third party chose to exercise
a statutory right and raise the bid? In the absence of the raised bids
the matter would have gone to final determination and P would have
collected his claim before it became barred. Upon the bids being raised
the Superior Court Clerk was under a statutory duty to reject the
prior bid and readvertise and resell the property.' 9 He is required
to do this each time a bid is upset, and there is no limit on the number
of times a bid may be raised.20 It is not difficult to perceive that these
circumstances may open the door to fraud. A debtor, by securing the
collusion of others, is afforded a means of which he may avail himself
to escape payment of a legally owed debt, even though the creditor has
not been guilty of laches or an unreasonable delay in attempting to collect it. It would be unwise to hazard a guess as to just how far judgment debtors would be able to go in escaping their just obligations by
this procedure. However, it does seem clear that there would be many
occasions on which it could be used unjustly and illegally to defeat a
valid claim which the creditor had taken steps to collect in seemingly
adequate time. To attempt to bypass this argument by saying that the
creditor should not wait so long to enforce his claim is to say that the,
statute of limitations is, realistically considered, something less than ten
years. Just how much less would, of course, depend on the facts of
each case. Our statutes provide that the action must be commenced
"0Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936); accord, Morrison
v. Lewis, 197 N. C. 79, 147 S. E. 729 (1929) ; cf. Tarboro v. Pender, 153 N. C.
427, 69 S. E. 425 (1910);

MCINTOsH,

NORTH

CAROLINA

PRACrIcE

(1929), §§106, 303; 34 Am!. JUR. (1941), Limitation of Actions, §247.
Pipkin v. Adams, 114 N. C. 201, 19 S. E. 105 (1894).
1834 Amr. JUR. (1941), Limitation of Actions, §38.
29 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2591.
20 Ibid.

& PRoc.
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within ten years; they do not say that it must be commenced and finally
determined within that period. 21 Unfortunately, they do not indicate
what is- meant by the word "action." However, since execution and
sale is the only method by which a judgment may be collected, it does
not seem illogical to conclude that execution and sale were meant to
come within the purview -of "action" as used in the statutes. On the
basis of these observations it is contended that the court should-have
held either that P had, by the execution and sale, sufficiently commenced an action to suspend the statute, or that he was within the
protection of that part of the statute's saving clause which provides
that ". . the time during which the party recovering or owning such
judgment shall be, or shall have been, restrained from proceeding thereon
... by a statutory prohibition, does not constitute any part of the ten
years .... "22
It will be argued by those in agreement with the Court's decision
that P could have adequately protected himself by bringing a suit on
the about-to-expire judgment when it appeared that it would be barred
before the proceedings under the execution were consummated. By so
doing he would have acquired a new judgment against which a new
ten-year period would begin to run.2 3 It does not seem that the availability of this remedy justifies the decision. It is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which this remedy would be merely illusory and
completely inadequate. The new judgment obtained in such a suit
would not relate back to the date of the original judgment. Rather, it
would be effective only from the date on which it was obtained and
docketed.2 4 Thus, any claims that may have attached to the property
of the debtor after the original judgment was obtained, but before the
new judgment became effective, would take precedence over the latter
judgment. In many instances the creditor may find that there is nothing to satisfy this judgment because all of the debtor's assets have been
absorbed in satisfying the intervening third party claims. Furthermore,
the creditor would have to begin anew the process of collecting the debt
due by execution and sale. 25* Obviously this means added expense
which the debtor must bear. Or, if his assets are not sufficient to
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§437, 438, 614.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §614.
"-N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(1); King v. N. C. Ry. Co., 184
N. C. 442, 115 S.E. 172 (1922); McDonald v. Dickinson, 85 N. C. 248 (1881).
"Springs v. Pharr, 131 N. C. 191, 42 S. E. 590 (1902) ; McLean v. McLean,
90 N. C. 530 (1884); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcrIcE & PROC. (1929),
§159(3).
"* The execution and proceedings thereunder based on the original judgment
could not be continued after that judgment became barred by the lapse of the
ten-year statutory period. Being based on the original judgment they would fail
when that original judgment was no longer effective to support them. This
would necessitate the beginning anew the efforts to collect the debt with these
new proceedings being based on and supported by the new judgment.
21

22
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satisfy the judgment, as is often the case, it must be borne by the
creditor.
In view of these considerations it is submitted that that the decision
in the instant case is wrong. Not only does it open the door to fraud,
but it seems highly inequitable. The statute of limitations has been
employed to penalize a party who has taken all available steps to collect
his claim before the statutory period expired. In Butler v. Bell 20 the
Court commented thus on the statute of limitations: "It is a wise and
beneficial law, not designed merely to deprive anyone of his just rights
by lapse of time, but to afford security against stale demands." Certainly it was not intended to permit or make possible any such decision
27
as was rendered in the case at hand. *

One further point deserves consideration. What steps should be
taken to cure the undesirable result reached in the instant case? It is
suggested that proper legislative action would provide the most feasible
and adequate answer to this query. Prior to 1943 an analogous situation
existed as to foreclosures of deeds of trust or mortgages which were
begun before being barred by the statute, but which were not con28
summated by delivery of a deed until after the ten-year period elapsed.
The 1943 General Assembly wisely remedied this incongruity in our
legal pattern by the passage of an act which provides, in effect, that
deeds executed and delivered after the running of the statute of limitations, in consummation of a foreclosure proceeding on a deed of trust
or mortgage, begun before the statute expired, are valid. 29 It is indeed unfortunate that an act was not passed providing that issuance of
execution on a judgment and a sale thereunder would suspend the
statute of limitations. We strongly recommend that the Legislature
pass such an act and thereby preclude any future decisions akin to the
one rendered in the instant case.
WILLIAm

A. JOHNSON.

:o181 N. C. 85, 106 S. E. 217 (1921).
7* The effect of the decision in the case at hand will be to induce judgment
creditors to take steps to collect their claims long before the statutory period is
nearing an end so that there will be no possibility of finding themselves in the
position of the creditor in the instant case. Such early and rigorous enforcement
of judgment claims will in many cases work a hardship on the debtor which he
might not have experienced had the creditor felt safe in allowing him more time
in which to settle the debt.
28 Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 200 S. E. 25 (1938) ; Note (1939) 17 N. C.
L. REv. 448.
29N.
C. Pub. L. 1943, c. 16. This Act is amendment to N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §2589.
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Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds Under Section 22(b) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code
Insured took out a "Whole Life Policy" for $100,000. The policy
bestowed upon the insured the right to select one of three settlement
options, or upon the beneficiary if the insured had not exercised such
right. Insured died without having selected any of the options, and
beneficiary chose option C, which provided that she was to have the
whole or any part of the proceeds of the policy at the death of the
insured paid in either 10, 15, 20, or 25 stipulated payments based upon
a mortality table.'* If the beneficiary should survive the number of
installments selected, similar installments were to be continued during
her lifetime. Should she die before the total installments were paid,
the remaining installments were to be commuted and paid to her estate.
Under option C the beneficiary chose to have the proceeds paid in
120 monthly installments over a 10-year period, amounting to $597
monthly.2 * During 1940 the beneficiary received from the insurance
company $6,294, consisting of 10 monthly installments of $597 each,
with the last nine of these installments increased by monthly dividends
of $36 each. She reported this income as non-taxable for the year.
The life insurance company, in accordance with Treasury Regulations,
filed with the Treasury Department Form 1099, reporting $2,009.51
of the sum paid beneficiary as "Taxable Portion of Total Paid under
Supplementary Contracts." This sum now claimed to be taxable by
the Commissioner under Treasury Regulations 103, Section 19.22(b)
(1)-13* is obtained as follows:
'*Age of Beneficiary

Number of Installments Stipulated
10
15
20
25
58
$70.67
$65.24
$59.29
$53.65
The table applies pro rata per $1,000 of the amount to be so paid.
2*8.45 per cent of 100 times $70.67 with cents omitted.
', "Life insurance-Amounts paid by reason of the death of the insured.-The
proceeds of life insurance policies, paid by reason of the death of an insured to
his estate or to a beneficiary (individual, partnership, or corporation), directly or
in trust, are excluded from the gross income of the beneficiary, except in the
case of certain transferees as provided in section 19.22(b) (2) (A) -3 and in the
case of a spouse to whom such payments are income under section 22(k). If,
however, such proceeds are held by the insurer under an agreement to pay interest
thereon, the interest payments must be included in gross income. In the case of
a beneficiary to whom payments are made in installments pursuant to an option
exercised by such beneficiary, the amount exempted is the amount payable immediately after the death of the insured had such beneficiary not elected to exercise
an option to receive the proceeds of the policy or any part thereof at a later date
or dates. [Italics supplied.] In any mode of settlement pursuant to an agreement of the insurer with a beneficiary the portion of each distribution which is to
be included in gross income shall be determined as follows:
"(a) Proceeds held by the insurer.-If the proceeds are held by the insurer
under an agreement with a beneficiary to distribute either the increment to such
proceeds currently, or the proceeds and increment in equal installments until both'
are exhausted, there shall be included in gross income, the increment so paid to
the beneficiary, or so credited to the fund in each year by the insurer.
"(b) Proce-eds payable in installments for a fixed number of years.-If, pur-
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--$5,141.39

Life Expectancy of Beneficiary on Basis of Mortality Tables
(19.45)
$5,141.39 x 10 (Number of Monthly payments received
during first taxable year)
=_$_4,284.49
12 Months
$6,294.00 (Sum paid beneficiary, including $324 dividends)
4,284.49 (Admitted non-taxable income)
$2,009.51 (Sum claimed to be taxable)
The Commissioner also argues that the beneficiary, by electing
option C, entered into a new contract with the insurer and that the
part of the payments in excess of the amount payable in a lump sum
at the death of the insured is taxable. The sum left with the insurance
suant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments for a fixed number of years, the amount that would have been payable by the insurance company
immediately upon the death of the insured (if payment at a later date had not
been provided for) is to be divided by the total number of installments payable over
the fixed number of years for which payment is to be made, and the quotient
represents the -portion of each installment to be excluded from gross income. The
amount of each installment in excess of such excluded .portion is to be included
in gross income. For example, if, at the insured's death, $1,000 would have been
payable in a single installment, but 10 equal annual payments are made in lieu
thereof, the portion of the installment received during any taxable year to be
excluded from gross income is $100 ($1,000 divided by 10). Any amount received as an installment in excess of $100 is to be included in gross income.
"If the proceeds are payable in installments for a taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1941 to a spouse who was divorced or legally separated from the
insured under a court decree, such proceeds are to be excluded from" the income
of such spouse to the extent provided in the preceding paragraph only if not
required to be included in her gross income under section 22(k), relating to
alimony income. Thus, if under the terms of a divorce decree, an insurance
policy upon the life of the husband is to be purchased by him to provide a principal sum of $10,000 payable upon his death in 10 annual installments, with interest, to his divorced wife, the full amount of such installments received by the
wife, including the interest, is to be included in her income. See further section
22(b) (2), section 22(k), section 19.22(b) (2) (A)-4 and section 19.22(k)-i.
"'(c) Proceeds payable in installments during tie life of the beneficiary.-If,
pursuant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments during the
life of the beneficiary the amount of each installment that is to be included in
gross income will be determined as in paragraph (b) of this section, except that
the number of years to be used in the specified computation will be determined
by the life expectancy of the beneficiary, as calculated by the table of mortality
used by "the particular insurance company in determining the amount of the
annuity.
"(d) Proceeds payable for a fixed number of years and for continued life.-If
pursuant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments for a fixed
number of years and for continued life. the amount of each installment that is to
be included in gross income will be determined either as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section if the fixed number of years for which payment is to be made
exceeds the life expectancy of the beneficiary, as calculated by the table of mortality used by the particular insurance company in determining the amount of the
annuity; or, as provided in paragraph (c) of this section if such life expectancy
exceeds the specified fixed period."
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company according to the Commissioner's contention, was in the nature
of a loan from which she received interest or compensation for the use
of the funds. Held, the installments are computed according to a schedule contained in the policy. No part of them are denominated as interest, but-unlike dividends-are payable whether the company earns
money or not. The rights flow from the policy granted the beneficiary
and are paid by reason of the death of the insured. Therefore, of the
$,294 received, only $324.00 in dividends is taxable. 4
"While Congress has power to require inclusion in gross income
increments of moneys payable by reason of the maturing of life insurance contracts by death of the insured, it has not done so under the
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934." 5 The history of Congressional
action pertaining to insurance installments plainly shows that such
payments are to be exempt from taxation. Section 213(b) (1) of the
Revenue Act of 1924, and previous acts exempted: "(1) The proceeds
of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the insured." 6*
This provision was modified in the Revenue Act of 1926, Section
213(b) (1), which provided for the exclusion from gross income any
"Amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of
the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or in installments.... "7 The change in the 1926 Act was intended ". . . to prevent any interpretation which would deny exemption in the case of
installments." 8' The phrase "or otherwise" in the 1934 Act supplanted
"or in installments" in the Acts from 1926 through 1932 to make it clear
"... that the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable by reason of
the death of the insured in the form of an annuity are not includible
in gross income." 9
"The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has authority to prescribe
rules and regulations to administer the Revenue Act of 1934 under
powers conferred upon him by Section 32 thereof. Any regulation consistent with the law is valid and its promulgation a proper exercise
of the power conferred upon him, but it does not empower him to change
or alter the law.
"The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not
the power to make law ... but the power to *adopt regulations to carry
into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regula'Pierce v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 2 T. C. No. 106 (1943).
'Allis v. LaBudde, 128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).

'* 43 ST-T. 267
(1924). For a comparative analysis on the statutes covering
this point see BARTOX AXD BROW.NIX(G. FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE LAWS (7th
ed. 1936), p. 21.
744 STAT. 24 (1926).
8 Conference Report, H. R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33.
' Finance Committee Report No. 558, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 23.
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tion which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity."' 1°
It is well settled under Section 22(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code that amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by
reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise, are to be excluded from taxable gross income, pursuant to an
election of settlement option made by the insured prior to the maturity
of the policy."
The principal case on this point is Com'r of Int. Rev.
v. Winslow. 12 * In this case the X Insurance Society agreed, in consideration of the payment of an annual premium of $2,569.44, to pay
the designated beneficiary [Winslow] $100,000 on receipt of notice of
the death of the insured. The insured selected an option providing for
payment in 50 annual installments of $2,000 each and also inserted a
"non-commutable clause." After payment of 13 premiums, the insured
died. The beneficiary surrendered the policy and received a bond providing for payment of 50 annual installments of $2,000 each. The installments also called for a three per cent interest rate. It was conceded that the commutation of 50 annual installments of $2,000 each
on the date of the death, would be $53,000. Beneficiary received
$2,581.40 in 1934 and did not include this sum in his gross income.
Altogether he bad received from the insurer $45,473.40, representing
17 annual installments of $2,000 each, plus $11,473.40, being the total
of the additional payments each year. The Commissioner argued that
since the commuted value was $53,000, and that since $45,473.40 had
been received in prior years untaxed, under Treasury Regulations 86,
Section 22(b) (1), the difference of $7,526.60 representing tax free income, must be spread over the remaining 33 years. This would leave
only $228.08 as the exempt portion of the $2,581.40 received during
1934. The Board of Tax Appeals held the $2,000 portion of the installments exempt under Section 22(1) (1) of the Revenue Act of
1934, as arising from the 'death of the insured, and $581.40 taxable as
income not arising because of the death of the insured. The Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld this decision, 'declaring Treasury Regulations
86 to be invalid insofar as inconsistent with this decision.
The language ". . . amounts received under a life insurance contract
1053 STAT. 32 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §62 (1940); Com'r of Int. Rev. v.
Winslow, 113 F. (2d) 418, 423 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Manhatten Co. v. Com'r of

Int. Rev., 297 U. S. 129, 134, 56 Sup. Ct. 397, 400, 80 L. ed. 528, 531 (1936).

" Kaufman v. U. S., 131 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) ; Com'r of Int. Rev.
v. Bartlett, 113 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Buck, 41
B. T. A. 99 (1940), aff'd, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
2*39 B. T. A. 373 (1939), aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
It
was on the basis of Section 22(b) (1) as interpreted by this decision that the court
held the $324 in the Pierce Case to be taxable. This income was paid as dividends and was not received solely "by reason of the death of the insured."
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paid by reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or
13
otherwise.. ." is to be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning.
It is specifically provided by statute that ".

.

. if such amounts

[premiums due the beneficiary] are held by the insurer under an agreement to pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included
in gross income."' 14 In the case of United States v. Heilbroner,5 the
policy provided that the insurers were to pay the defendant beneficiary
annual sums described either as "interest" or "annuity" payments without dimunition of the corpus of the policy. Upon the death of the
defendant the insurers were to pay her children the face value of the
policy. The Commissioner refunded the money the beneficiary paid
on her return, holding that such sums were paid by the reason of the
death of the insured within the meaning of Section 22(b) (1) of the
Revenue Act of 1928. A new Commissioner demanded a return of
the money, which was refused; and an action was brought in the Federal Court to force a return. The Court held that the money was not
paid by reason of the death of the insured, but constituted interest, and
ordered a judgment in favor of the United States.
The same general rule applies to dividends received by the beneficiary. In the case of Kinnear v. Con'r of Int. Rev.' 6 the court held
dividends to be paid for reasons other than the death of the insured
to be fully taxable.
On the other hand the Revenue Department has ruled that "There
should ... be excluded from gross income not only the principal sum
or capital value of the life insurance policy as of the date of the death
of the insured but also any amounts added to such principal sum (when
it is paid in installments), pursuant to an option exercised by the
insured, by reason of the running of time."' 7 Similarly it has been held
that a small increase in each monthly installment payment after a certain date because of the discontinuance by the insurer of an administrative expense is excluded from gross income, the court holding such
to have been received under the insurance contract, or to have been a
gift exempt from taxation under Section 22(b) (3) of the Revenue
Act of 1934.18

In the case of Allis v. LaBudde' 9 the beneficiary's husband carried
policies providing for monthly payment to the beneficiary for a period
of 10 years and thereafter during beneficiary's lifetime. The insured
"' Helvering v. San Joaquin Co., 297 U. S. 497, 56 Sup. Ct. 569, 80 L. ed.
824 (1936).
"53 STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b)(1) (1940).
' 100 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
1620 B. T. A. 718 (1930).
1 General Counsel's Memorandum, 23523, 1943-6-11376.
" Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Bartlett, 113 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
19128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
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died in 1918. Beneficiary did not include the installments paid after
the 10-year period during either 1934 or 1935. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue attempted to include these sums in her gross income
under Regulations 86, Section 22(b)(1)-i; but the Circuit Court of
Appeals held this regulation to be inconsistent with the intent of Congress and excluded these sums from gross income.
As a result of the Winslow Case, the Allis Case and other similar
cases, the Commissioner amended previous regulations. In "Regulations One-Eleven," Section 29.22(b)(1)-i, as released October 28,
1943, the Commissioner provided that "In case of a beneficiary to whom
payments are made in installments pursuant to an option exercised by
such beneficiary, the amount exempted is the amount payable immediately after the death of the insured had such beneficiary not elected
to exercise an option to receive the proceeds of the policy or any part
thereof at a later date or dates." The consistency of this regulation
with the statute as laid down by Congress was tested in the Pierce
Case, supra, and was declared inconsistent with Congressional intent
as laid down in the statute. Previously the same court had said:
"Whether such arrangement with the company was made by the beneficiary or by the insured is regarded as immaterial." 20 * Without the
use of this dictum the court now said that by death of the insured the
beneficiary acquired one of several property rights, and in exercising
21
any of them, the right would spring from the policy.
Thus it appears that the Courts have consistently followed the will
of Congress that there shall be excluded from gross income ". .. amounts
received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of
the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise.
,,2 (Italics ours.)
Congress having provided for income taxation, it might be argued
that the Commissioner, through his Regulations, was attempting to
carry out the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes
Congress to ". .. lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration. '23 (Italics ours.) Income may be defined as "that gain or recurrent benefit (usually measured in money) which proceeds from labor, business, or property."'z
(Italics ours.) The Federal Court has defined income as "all gain
25
from capital, labor, or-both."
20* Winslow v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 39 B. T. A. 373 (1939), in commenting upon
G. C. M. 13796, XIII-2 C. B.41 (October 2,1934).
2 Latterman v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E. (2d)
978 (1939).
STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b)
2253

23
U. S. Const. Amend. XVI.
24
WEBssrz's NEw INTERNATIONAL

2

In re Owl

(1) (1940).

DIcTIoNARY (2nd ed.), p. 1258.
Drug Co., 21 Fed. Supp. 907, 909 (1937).
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Most policies have an option providing for immediate settlement
with the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. This sum, payable
immediately, may be called theoretically an investment, which is nontaxable. However, upon exercising an option calling for installment
payments over a period of years, the sum total received is greater than
the amount receivable immediately upon the death of the insured. This
"gain" is in reality "income" on the "investment."
An illustrative example is as follows. Suppose the policy provides
for settlement with the beneficary under two options:
(1) The face value of the policy, $50,000, is to be paid immediately.
(2) Leaving the proceeds with the insurer, the insurer to pay 10
annual installments of $6,000 each.
As a result of choosing option (2) the beneficiary receives an extra
net non-taxable income of $10,000 over the 10-year period, or $1,000
annually. If the policy provided for a stipulated number of installments, and an extension for life of the beneficiary provided his life
exceed the number of guaranteed installments, as in the Allis Case,
supra, any amounts received above the face value of the policy may be
regarded as income in economic usage and as a practical matter; and yet
remain non-taxable.
Under the Revenue Act of 1934 and subsequent laws the yearly income received from an annuity is divided into two parts. Three per
cent of the cost of the annuity is included in gross income; and the

remainder, if any, is to be excluded. As soon as the aggregate amount
excluded equals the cost of the annuity, any sums received'thereafter
are to be included in gross income .2 * This rule also applies to life
insurance and endowment policies paid other than by reason of the

death of the insured. An exception to this rule is an annuity payable
to a wife in settlement of alimony, which is fully taxable.
The Court has defined an annuity ".... as a sum paid yearly or at
other specified intervals in return for the payment of a fixed sum by

the annuitant. The annuity itself is the totality of the payment to be
made under the contract." 28

The Revenue Department has defined it

thus: "A stated sum payable periodically at stated times during life,
or a specified number of years under an obligation to make payments
in consideration of a gross sum paid for such obligation, which gross
sum is exhausted in the making of the periodic payments."29
20*53 STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b) (2) (1940); Regulations OneEleven, Section 29.22(b) (2)-1.

For a comparison of the law on this point see

1936), p. 21.
1 56 STAT. 816 (1942); 26 U. S. C. A. §22(k) (Supp. 1943); Regulations
One-Eleven,
Section 2922(k)-i.
2
Bodine v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 103 F. (2d) 982, 984 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).

BARTON AND BROWNING, FmEERAL INCOME AND ESTATE LAWS (7th ed.,

2 General Counsel's Memorandum 21666, C. B. 1940-1, cited in Frackelton v.
Com'r of Int." Rev., 46 B. T. A. 883, 894 (1942).
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A somewhat similar treatment might be made in the case of insurance installments. Rather than tax the sum total of the premiums paid
to the insurer at three per cent, a.tax might be levied on the cash value
of the policy at the time of the death of the insured, exempting all income above three per cent taxable income until the excluded non-taxable
income reaches the 'face value of the policy. This plan in no way
would tax the corpus of the policy, but would be a tax on the income
only.
It is evident that Congress is leaving untouched an abundant source
of taxable income. In this era when every available source should be
tapped, it is suggested that Section 22(b) (1) be amended so as to
include sums paid above the value of the policy at the time of the death.
CECIL

J.

HILL.

Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Unexplained
Airplane Accidents
In a recent North Carolina case of first impression the Supreme
Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to an unexplained airplane accident. The facts of the case were that a passenger
invited by the pilot for a ride was injured when the plane crashed without any apparent reason. Both the plaintiff and the pilot testified that
the plane went into a spin and crashed, and that neither had any knowledge of the reason why. The Court said that "The 'doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply because any number of causes may have been
responsible for the plane falling, including causes over which the pilot
had absolutely no control, it being common knowledge that aeroplanes
do fall without the fault of the pilot."'
Translated literally, res ipsa toquitur means "the thing speaks for
itself." The doctrine had its origin in 1863 in an English case where
a barrel of flour fell from a second story window and injured the plaintiff.2 It involves the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the
plaintiff's case by allowing an inference or presumption of negligence
to arise from the circumstances of the accident itself. An accident resulting in injury must be accompanied by surrounding circumstances
which, viewed in the light of the entire situation, give rise to an inference of negligence. From the layman's point of view it can be stated
as follows: "What is required is evidence from which reasonable men
may conclude that, upon the whole, it is more likely that there was
negligence than there was not." 3
The deirelopment of the doctrine has led to much confusion in
1 Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 535, 27 S. E. (2d) 442, 443 (1943).
2

Bryne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).

' PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §43.
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various courts as to the types of accidents to which the doctrine applies
and as to the procedural effect of its application. 4* In this note there
will be no further discussion of the procedural effects of res ipsa loquitur, except to point out that North Carolina follows 'the "inference"
rule, by which the jury is free to find negligence or not.5

I. DoEs

REs IPSA LOQUITUR APPLY TO UNEXPLAINED
AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS?

A. Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
airplane accidents more or less arbitrarily. Such lecisions seem to
rest on the theory that the inference that there had been negligence on
the part of the defendant must be stronger than the inference that there
was not. Nothing else appearing, the scales being evenly balanced between negligence and non-negligence, the courts say that the airplane
has not reached such a stage of development as to make the inference of
negligence the stronger one.
The North Carolina Court seems to have relied solely on the New
York case of Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop. In this case
the plane crashed at night into the plaintiff's tower carrying transmission lines, doing considerable property damage. The Court said: "It is
common knowledge that airplanes fall in a great many instances from
causes over which the pilot has absolutely no control. Time and again
we read in the newspapers where a complete inspection of the plane is
made before starting and that for some unknown reason the engine stops,
requiring a forced landing which often results in a crash." 6* In this case,
'* HARPER, TORTS (1938)
§77. "The effect of the doctrine, once it is applicable,
is not quite clear from the cases, some courts holding to one, some another and
still others to all three of the possible results. The least effect of the presumption

that is said to arise from the rule of res ipsa loquitur is to furnish 'some' evidence of negligence, sufficient to insure the plaintiff of getting his case to the
jury if the defendant offers no rebutting evidence. . . . Again, the presumption
is sometimes held to require the defendant to come forward with some explanation
or some rebutting evidenc . If he does so, there ig a jury case, but if he fails
to satisfy this burden, the defendant cannot get to the jury on the issue of negligence and is subject to a-verdict directed against him. . . . Still other jurisdictions hold that when the plaintiff makes out a res ipsa loquitur case, the
burden of proof, in the strict sense, is on the defendant and the risk of obtaining
an affirmative finding by the jury on the issue of negligence is upon him. The
plaintiff is entitled to the verdict unless the defendant satisfies the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of negligence."
'Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 13 S. E. (2d) 242 (1941), 19 N. C.
L. REv. 671; White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921); Womble v.
Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. E. 493 (1904).
o,266 N. Y. Supp. 469, 472 (1933). In Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways,
242 App. Div. 625, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1107, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 21 (1934), aff'd, 266
N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935) there were similar facts in that a passenger
plane crashed into high tension wires and burned. Controversy arose over
whether the plane should have attempted the trip under the weather conditions
and the defendant claimed that an unavoidable accident had occurred. The Court
said that the mere fact that an accident occurred did not make the defendant
liable, but the plaintiff was awarded a verdict on negligence.
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it is to be noted that although the Cotirt refused to apply res ipsa
loquitur, the plaintiff recovered on the theory of trespass. Tennessee
has a case of a plane crashing on a sightseeing trip which said: "This is
not a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur, for it is a common and
not unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall while in operation,
and without the intervention of any act upon the part of the operator.
Under such circumstances it was the duty of the plaintiff to point out
the negligence upon which they attributed the proximate cause of the
injury.' 7 In the Arkansas case of Herndon v. Gregory, the Court cited
cases in which the doctrine of res ipsa loqitur had been applied to airplane accidents, but refused to follow them, saying: "While it has been
judicially recognized that aviation is no longer an experiment, it still is
in its formative stage, and liability of the carrier should hardly be measured by the same rule of law governing transportation by land or water.
...It would appear that one taking flight in an airplane assumes certain
apparent risks in this mode of travel which are of greater hazard than
travel on land or water. . . This accident may have been caused by
one or more of a number of reasons over which the owner and operator
of the airplane had no control." 8
A Wyominge* and a Georgia case10 seem in accord with the previous
cases in saying that the time had not yet arrived for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents. In an Ontario
case, where the pilot was killed in a crash caused by a welding defect,
the Court found no evidence of the defendant manufacturer's negligence
and refused to apply res ipsa loquitur.11
B. In contrast to those courts which have held the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable to unexplained airplane accidents, other courts
have held that the doctrine is applicable.
New York, in a case previous to the Dunlop Case, where a passenger
plane crashed on a clear day after making a turn, held: "The charge
was likewise prejudicial in its failure to charge the doctrine of res
'Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 410, 99 S. W. (2d)
557, 560, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 145, 151 (1935).
8190 Ark. 702, 709, 81 S.W. (2d) 849, 852, 1935 U. S.Av.R. 44, 45 (1935).
'*Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D. C.
Wyo. 1937). A plane crashed on itstest flight. The Court, inholding for the
defendant, said: "It may be that in the not too distant future in the evolution and
development of the wonderful and enchanting science of aviation, a sufficient fund
of information and knowledge may be afforded to make a safe basis in compensating for, the injuries sustained, the doctrine here invoked; but it seems to
me quite clear that the time has not yet arrived .... It will not do to discourage
the pioneer by making him assume undue hazards in a monetary way. In the
meantime it is quite evident that those who choose air-ways for transportation
must in many instances be held to have themselves assumed the risk."
o Morrison v. Le Tourneau, 138 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
"' McCoy v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1942 U. S. Av. 1. 154 (Sup. Ct., Ontario,
1939)..
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ipsa loquitur, which had, under the facts appearing in this record, application to this case as a rule of evidence to aid the jury in passing upon
the issue of liability."'12 In another New York case, which was decided
subsequent to the Dunlop Case, an experienced pilot rented a plane and
kept it aloft longer than he had been told the gas supply would permit
and as a consequence of this, and the failure to use the reserve tank,
the plane ran out of gas and crashed. Here the Court stated: "Although
the burden of proof of negligence in such cases unquestionably rests upon
the plaintiff, yet he is not always required to point out the precise act
or omission in which the negligence consists. . . Negligence may be
inferred from the circumstances of the case. Where the accident, as in
the case at bar, is one which in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened but for the want of proper care on the part of the defendant, it is incumbent upon him to show that he had taken such precaution as prudence would ictate, and his failure to furnish the proof,
where if it existed, it would be within his power, may subject him to
the inference that such precautions were omitted."'1 3 Two California
cases, Smith v. O'Donnell'4 and Thomas v. American Airways' 5 have
held the doctrine applicable to airplane accidents. In line with these
decisions are an Alaskan case" and a- Washington case.' 7 The Washington case is unusual in that the defendant's plane, while on the ground,
ran across a field with no one at the controls and damaged the plaintiff's hangar and plane.
In another Ontario case, where a passenger plane crashed while the
pilot attempted to gain control after pulling out from a dive, the Court
said: "Travel by aeroplane must now be regarded as a common means
of transport, extensively used, not only throughout North America, but
in many other parts of the world. With experienced and careful pilots
and proper equipment, a passenger has the right to expect that he will
be carried safely to his destination.""' The Manitoba Court followed
Ontario in holding the doctrine applicable in Mclnmerny v. McDougall,1 and in Nysted v. Wings Ltd.20 These Canadian cases seem to be
Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 247 N. Y. Supp. 251, 253 (1930).
Service, Inc. v. Thompson, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 602, 607,
1939 U. S. Av. R. 142, 147 (1938) ; accord, Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.,
236 App. Div. 664, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 148 (1930), off'd, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1010,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 163 (1932).
a, 215 Cal. 714, 5 P. (2d) 690 (1931), aff'd and opinion adopted, 12 P. (2d)
933 (1932).
-

"Braman-Johnson

15

1935 U. S. Av. R. 102.

a Smith v: Pacific Alaska Airways, 89 F. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
'Genero
v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P. (2d) 116, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 11
(1934).
8
" Malone v. Trans-Canada Airlines & Moss v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 369, 371
(Ct. of App., Ontario, 1942).
Rep. 625, 1938 U. S. Av. RL 166 (K. B., Manitoba,
1' 3 Western Weekly
1938).
20 3 D. L. R. 336 (K. B., Manitoba, 1942).
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in line with the British case of Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork Ltd., in
which a plane crashed just after the take-off. Here the Court said:
"That this disastrous accident was due to the fault of the pilot, is in
my opinion, abundantly dear. In the first place I hold that the doctrine
of res ipsa2 loquitur applies. . . . It was argued that I ought not to
apply this doctrine to an aeroplane, a comparatively new means of locomotion, and one necessarily exposed to the many risks which must be
encountered in flying through the air, but I cannot see that this is any
reason for excluding it. Large numbers of aeroplanes are daily engaged
in carrying mails and passengers all over the world, and as is well
known, they arrive and depart with the regularity of express trains.
They have indeed become a common-place method of travel, supple2
menting, though not superceding, rail and sea transport." '
C. Some courts have held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable but only in a proper case, that is to say when all prerequisites are present. Only two of these prerequisites have caused diffi.culties in the airplane cases and call for any further comment.
(1) Control of the instrumentality. ". . . when certain types of
harms occur under circumstances, which from common experience,
strongly suggest negligence and when the agency or instrumentality
which occasioned the harm is under the exclusive control and management of the defendant, so that he is in a better position to prove his
innocence than the plaintiff is to prove his negligence, there exists a
'22
res ipsa loquitur case."
In the California case of Parker v. Granger,23* the South Dakota
case of Budgett v. Soo Sky WaysA* and the Tennessee case of Towle
25
v. Phillips,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable because the planes were equipped with dual controls, and it was not shown
that at the time of the accident the defendants were in complete control.
In Michigan Aero Club v. Shelle3y20 although Michigan purports not to

apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in any situation,27 the Court
talks as if the doctrine, although not calling it by name, would have
2153 T. L. R. 254, 255,
" HARPER, ToRTs (1938)
23*4

81 Sol. J. 80, 81, 1938 U. S. Av. R. 194, 197 (1936).
Cal. (2d) 668, 52 P.§77.
(2d) 226 (1935). Planes were rented to a movie

company through the defendant. Two planes collided and all were killed. Each
plane had dual controls, and a pilot and director were in each plane. Neither
director could fly, but one director was to signal by wiggling the wings by rocking
the wheel back and forth. The Court said that this might show that the plane
was not under the exclusive control of the pilot.
2A*64 S. D. 243, 266 N. W. 253 (1936).
The passengers were prospective
buyers of the plane which had dual controls. Both were flyers and were seated
in a single cockpit with a control stick between them.
2 172 S. W. (2d) 806 (Ct. of App., Tenn., 1943).
28283
Mich. 401, 278 N. W. 121 (1938).
27
Peplinski v. Kleinke, 299 Mich. 86, 299 N. W. 818 (1941) ; Wabeke v. Bull,
289 Mich. 551, 286 N. W. 825 (1939) ; Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209
N. W. 835 (1926) ; Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213, 203 N. W. 868 (1925).
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applied had the instrumentality been shown to have been under the
control of the defendant. Massachusetts .held that the doctrine was
inapplicable to a case where a plane crashing into water, ruined the
passenger's clothing. The case turned on the fact that the inspection
of the plane had been done by others than the defendant, and the Court
said, "The principle of res ipsa loquitur only applies where the direct
cause of the accident and so much of the surrounding circumstances as
were essential to its occurrence were within the sole control of the
defendant or their servants. 28
It is to be noted that Canada, in its determination to hold the doctrine applicable to unexplained airplane accidents, ignored in the McInn erny Case the fact that the dual controls of the plane still being
connected might have enabled one other than the pilot to be in control.
Instead of using this point as prohibiting application of the doctrine,
the Court said that the failure of the pilot to disconnect the dual controls was evidence of his lack of skill and experience.
(2) Direct evidence. The second requirement of res ipsa loquitur
causing difficulty in the airplane cases has been summed up as follows:
"Different jurisdictions are hopelessly in conflict upon the effect of
pleading specific acts of negligence in a case which is properly the subject of the application of res ipsa loquitur. The better reasoning, however, seems to favor the view that such allegation of particular negligent
acts does not preclude the plaintiff from relying upon the presumption
created by the doctrine although there are strong decisions by courts
to the contrary.

'29

Canadian 30 and British3' cases have applied res ipsa loquitur although specific allegations of negligence were made. The Canadian
Court stated its position firmly in saying, "Thus if under the law of
evidence, negligence will be inferred in certain circumstances, and if the
plaintiff can prove those circumstances, he need not plead acts of negligence, but may rely on the operation of law to infer negligence ...
And even when he does so plead (as the plaintiffs do in this case) he
does not thereby confine himself to the pleaded particulars, nor lose his2
'
right to rely upon the wider negligence, if the maxim is applicable. 3
Other courts refuse to apply the doctrine when there is evidence of
negligence. New York courts have held both ways. A New York City
8 Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 425, 180 N. E. 212, 214,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 139, 143 (1932).
. HARPER, TORTS (1938)

§77; see

PROSSER, TORTS

(1941)

§44.

'oNysted v. Wings Ltd. & Anson v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 336 (K. B., Manitoba,
1942).
" Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd., 53 L. T. R. 254, 81 Sol. J. 80, 1938
U. S. Av. R. 194 (1936).
" Nysted v. Wings Ltd. & Anson v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 336, 346 (K. B., Manitoba, 1942).
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Municipal Court in the case of Braman-Johnson Service, Inc. v. Thomson,33 although the plaintiff alleged specific counts of negligence, applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. But in Goodheart v. American Airlines, in the Appellate Division, the Court said: "The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, although itprovides for a substitute for direct proof of
negligence where the plaintiff is unable to point out the specific act of
negligence which caused his injury, is a rule of necessity to be invoked only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available." 4* IllinoisO and Texas36* refused
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases where specific acts of
negligence were pleaded, and California did likewise in the case involving an injury suit for the death of the famous explorer Martin
37
Johnson.
The Arkansas case of Herndon v. Gregory is peculiar. Although
there is a strong declaration that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable to airplane accidents, the Court said: "If the complaint
had alleged some particular act of negligence or some unusual or out of
the ordinary occurrence, from which negligence might be presumed...
then it would have alleged a fact over which human conduct had control
which might have given rise to the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur."38 The dissenting judge took the view that this would
be precisely the case when res ipsa loquitur would not be applied.80*
II.

SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLY TO ALL
UNEXPLAINED AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS?

The North Carolina Court in refusing to apply the doctrine of res
ipka loquitur in the Whitley Case based its decision on Rochester Gas
and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, supra. However, that case did not involve injury to a passenger, but property -damage for which the plaintiff
"83 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 602, 1939 U. S. Av. R.142 (1938).
8*1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 288, 291 (1937).
" McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 502, 1933
U. S.
Av. P. 105 (1932).
8
*English, v. Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 643, 644 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931). The
plaintiff's son was killed when the plane crashed while stunt-flying. The Court
said, "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, under the facts revealed by this record,

would be applicable . . . but for the fact, as contended by the appellant, that the
appellee pleaded specific acts of negligence . . . for which reason the doctrine
cannot be invoked or applied in this case."
' Johnson v. Western Air Express Corp., 45 Cal. App. (2d) 614, 114 P. (2d)

(1941).
8190 Ark. 702, 710, 81 S. W. (2d) 849, 852, 1935 U. S.Av. . 38, 45 (1935).
89* See Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 714, 82 S.W. (2d) 244, 246, 1935
U. S. Av. . 38, 48 (1935) (dissenting opinion) : "The rule of res ipsa loquilur
is applied where no act of negligence is known, in
that it would not have happened in the ordinary
gence. The majority opinion then calls attention
but said in each of those cases that the complaint
I think the majority are mistaken in this."

cases where it is simply known
course of things but for neglito a number of airplane cases,
alleged some act of negligence.
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was allowed recovery on the theory of trespass. Furthermore, the
Dunlop Case is not the only New York decision on res ipsa loquitur.
New York courts have applied the doctrine in three cases and refused
to apply it in two other cases, not because the doctrine is inapplicable
to unexplained airplane accidents, but because the requirements for a
proper case were not present. The pattern formed by the New York
cases can be traced exactly by looking at all the decisions of the other
courts on this matter.
Recently North Carolina, in the face of many decisions contra,
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case of an unexplained
automobile accident. 40 The same statements that have been made refuting the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane
accidents have been made time and again in the past about unexplained
automobile accidents; yet the doctrine, as applied to automobile accidents, has gained widespread use. Both automobiles and airplanes have
gone through the stage of being called dangerous instrumentalities; yet
the automobile in a rapid stage of development has become the most
prevalent mode of transportation, and the airplane is following a similar development.
The aviation industry has opposed the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane accidents because it widens
the scope of liability. However, assuredly it cannot be said that aviation
is not now capable of taking care of its own liabilities. As a recent
author has said, "No one has yet contended that this lusty, new infant
of commerce cannot be self-supporting." 41
To courts which argue that "the time has not yet arrived" for the
application of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane accidents, it can
be replied that the incredible developments in aviation of the past years,
partly brought about by the war, have more clearly established the
-desirability for the treatment of the unexplained airplane accident cases
under the rules of negligence and the accompanying doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
IDRIENNE E. LEVY.

Joint-Tortfeasors-Effect of Payment by Party Not LiableSubrogation
A pedestrian was injured by falling over a stake protruding about
three-eights of an inch from a concrete sidewalk. In a suit against the
City of Charlotte the pedstrain obtained a judgment which the City
paid. In the present action the City seeks to recover from the abut"0Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 24 S. E. (2d) 477 (1943), 21 N. C.
L. RFv. 402.
" GEORGE B. LOGAN, AIRcRAFT LAW-MADE PLAIN (1928), p. 52.
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ting property owners the amount of the judgment or a proportionate
contribution thereto under the joint-tortfeasor statute, on the basis that
the protruding stake was on the property of the abutting owners who
had constructed a paved walk in front of their buildings similar to
and connecting with the City's sidewalk. Defendants demurred to the
complaint as not constituting a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the demurrer should have been sustained, on the ground
that the complaint failed to disclose any negligence on the part of the
City, and therefore the City was not a .joint tortfeasor under the
Statute.1
It may be assumed that the City's libality in the previous suit was
not on the theory that the defendant's land had been dedicated to public
use 2 or that the stake was so close to the public sidewalk as to constitute a .public hazard, 3 but rather on a mistake of fact, to wit, that
the protruding stake was on the City's sidewalk. Thus the present
decision is that the City cannot recover as a joint tortfeasor for the
reason that the City was not at fault in any respect since the obstruction
was not on its property, whereas the judgment in the previous case
necessarily implies the negligent maintenance of a public sidewalk. At
least -two important questions are presented: (1) Can the injured
pedestrian now sue and recover against the abutting property owners
for the same accident? (2) Is the City subrogated to the rights of the
injured pedestrian?
(1) The authorities are in direct conflict on the question of whether
payment to an injured party, by one not liable, operates to bar a subsequent recovery from the party legally liable. The question most frequently presents itself where the injured party seeks to recover after
having accepted, in return for a release or a covenant not to sue, compensation from a third party who thought himself liable. There are
numerous decisions which hold that regardless of the source of satisfaction the injured party is barred from further recovery, once he has
accepted satisfaction for the injury, because the settlement he has made
is "so far affected in equity and good conscience that the law will not
permit another recovery for the same damages. ' 4 The principle under"Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N. C. 106, 25 S. E. (2d) 407 (1943). The statute
was N. C. CODE A N. (Michie, 1939) §618.
involved
2
Whitacre v. Charlotte, 216 N. C. 687, 6 S. E. (2d) 558 (1939); Hemphill y
Forest City, 212 N. C. 185, 193 S. E. 153 (1937); Gault v. Lake Waccamaw,

200 N. C. 593, 158 S. E. 104 (1931); Durham v. White, 190 N. C. 568, 130 S. E.

161 (1925); Tise v.-Whitaker-Harvey Co., 146 N. C. 374, 59 S. E.1012 (1907).
1 Wall v. Asheville, 219 N. C. 163, 13 S. E. (2d) 260 (1941); Goldstein v.
R. R., 188 N. C. 636, 125 S. E. 177 (1924); Myers v. Asheville, 165 N. C. 703,

81 S. E. 1060 (1914) ; Austin v. Charlotte, 146 N. C. 336, 59 S. E. 701 (1907) ;
Browr v. Durham, 141 N. C. 249, 53 S.E. 513 (1906); Bunch v. Edenton, 90
N. C. 431 (1884).
'Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1 (1866).
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lying the rule that an injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction
is that he is given a legal remedy to obtain compensation only to the
extent of the damage done to him, and when that compensation has
been received he has no right to further relief. 5* Where the release or
covenant not to sue has been given in consideration of payment intended
by both parties to be full satisfaction for the injuries, such release or
covenant is held to bar another recovery because of the previous satisfaction.0 If the compensation received, in return for a release or covenant not-to sue, is found to be only partial satisfaction then it is treated
as payment pro tanto. 7* Some courts have refused to permit a suit by
the injured party against the party legally liable where he accepted
compensation from a third party, on the ground that he is estopped to
deny that the party from whom he accepted such compensation was
not, in fact, liable.s* However, in some jurisdictions, there must have
been an appearance of liability and a claim made against the third party
before compensation paid by him to the injured party will be held to
extinguish the claim.0
On the other hand, an almost equal number of courts have held that
'* Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 268 Pac. 943 (1928) ; Iowa State Bank
v. Frankle, 197 Iowa 1177, 197 N. W. 298 (1924); Middaugh v. Des Moines
Ice & Cold Storage Co., 184 Iowa 969, 169 N. W. 395, 18 N. C. C. A. 947 (1918) ;
Snyder v. Mutual Telephone Co., 135 Iowa 215, 112 N. W. 776 (1907) ; Miller v.
Beck, 108 Iowa 575, 582, 79 N. W. 344, 346 (1899) where the court said: "It is
entirely immaterial that the one from whom satisfaction was demanded and received was not liable for the entire damage. . . . A satisfaction by whomsoever
made, if accepted as such, is a bar to further proceedings on the same cause of
action"; Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S. W. 179
(1920); Lindsay v. Acme Cement Plaster Co., 220 Mich. 367, 190 N. W. 275
(1922) ; Colby v. Walker, 86 N. H. 568, 171 Atl. 774 (1934).
HLatham v. Des Moines Electric Co., 229 Iowa 1199, 6 N. W. (2d) 853 (1942);
Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284, 83 N. W. 1091 (1900).
"* Young v. Anderson, 33 Idaho 522, 196 Pac. 193 (1921) ; Jacobsen v. Woerner,
149 Kan. 598, 603, 89 P. (?d) 24, 28 (1939) where the court said: "If part satisfaction has already been obtained, further recovery can only be had of a sum
sufficient to accomplish satisfaction. It is not necessary that the party making
payment was in fact liable. Anything received on account of the injury inures
to the benefit of all and operates as a payment pro tanto. The plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfaction from whatever source it may come."
8, Leff v. Knewhow, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 360, 117 P. (2d) 922, 925 (1941) : "It
is immaterial whether or not the releasee was a guilty party, or even claimed to
be, and since a person injured is entitled to but one satisfaction, the releasor is
held to be estopped to deny the liability of the party expressly relieved, from
whom satisfaction was received." Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. 701, 268 Pac. 943
(1928) ; Sands v. Wilson, 140 Fla. 18, 191 So. 21 (1940) ; Greiner v. Hicks, 231
Iowa 141, 300 N. W. 727 (1941); Barden v. Hurd, 217 Iowa 798, 253 N. W.
127 (1934) ; Paris v. Crittendon, 142 Kan. 296, 46 P. (2d) 633 (1935) ; Abbott
v. City of Senath, 243 S. W. 641 (Mo., 1922); Hubbard v. Railroad Co., 173
Mo. 249, 72 S. W. 1073 (1903); Galvin v. Malheske, 266 N. Y. Supp. 373, 191
N. E. 486 (1933); Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S. W. 936 (Ct. of Civil A-pp., Tex.,
1925), aff'd, 280 S. W. 546 (Ct. of Civil App., Tex., 1926) (Plaintiff's contention that corporation from which they had received money in satisfaction of
judgment
against it was not liable, held inconsistent with good conscience.).
0
Kirkland v. Ensign-Brickford Co., 267 Fed. 472 (D. C. Conn. 1920) ; Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 86 N. E. 485 (1908).
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a release to, or settlement by, one not in fact liable does not destroy
the right to recover against the party legally liable.' 0 These decisions
are based on two grounds. First; that payment is not satisfaction unless it is made by the party legally liable, and thus does not fall within
the rule against double satisfaction, and second, that such settlement
cannot operate by way of estoppel since the one legally liable was not
a party or privy tb the arrangement and thus has no joint interest with
the one discharged." All the cases supporting this result involve previous releases and settlements, and none involve previous judgments.
But the significant fact is that a recovery against the party legally liable
is permitted although compensation had been received from another.
The previous decisions of our court indicate that North Carolina
is in line with the courts holding that there can be only one satisfaction
for the same injury regardless of who makes the payment. 12 In Holland
v. Utilities Co., plaintiff sued for injuries received in a collision between defendants street car and an express truck. Defendant denied
that it was negligent and in addition set out a prior covenant not to sue
given by the plaintiff to the Express Company in consideration of $500.
On the issues submitted the jury found that the defendant was guilty of
negligence but that the Express Company was. not. The court in
granting a new trial held that if the jury found that the plaintiff had
been fully compensated for the injury by the money paid by the Express
Company he was not entitled to recover against the defendant.' 3 As
the compensation bad taken the form of a covenant not to sue with all
rights of action retained against other parties, the court said that it was
a matter for the jury to determine whether plaintiff had been fully compensated. Had the compensation been received under a release of the
plaintiff's right of action and such not grossly inadequate, it may be
reasonably inferred that the court would have held the plaintiff compensated as a matter of law. If the plaintiff had received compensation
through satisfaction of a judgment rendered upon a jury verdict it
would have been binding upon him as full and complete satisfaction. As
the compensation in the present case was received in such a manner, it
0

Harlee v. Gulfport, 120 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Herberger v.

Anderson Motor Service Co., 268 Ill. App. 403 (1933); Lang v. Siddall, 218
Iowa 263, 254 N. W. 783 (1934) ; Caroll v. Kerrigen, 173 Md. 627, 197 Atl. 127
(1938) ; Lavelle v. Anderson, 197 Minn. 160, 266 N. W. 444 (1936); Brandstein

v. Ironbound Transp. Co., 112 N. J. L. 585, 172 Atl. 580 (1934); Stowell v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 259 S. W. 309 (Ct. of Civil App., Tex., 1924).
"' The Ross Coddington, 6 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925) ; General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. Tibbs, 102 Ind. App. 262, 2 N. E. (2d) 229

(1936); Renner v. Model Laundry, 191 Iowa 1288, 184 N. W. 611 (1921);
Jacowitz v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 273, 92 Atl. 946 (1915);
Turner v. Robbins, 276 Pa. 319, 120 Atl. 274 (1923).
12 Sircey v. Rees' Sons, 155 N. C. 296, 71 S. E. 310 (1911);
Howard v.
Plumbing Co., 154 N. C. 224, 70 S. E. 285 (1911).
13208 N. C. 289, 180 S. E. 592 (1935).
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would seem that the injured party would not be allowed to recover
again.
There remains the possibility of the city being subrogated in equity
to the rights of the injured party. Equitable subrogation is distinguished from conventional subrogation which must be brought upon a
contract or agreement between the parties.14 It is distinguished from
contribution in that the latter is a legal remedy and the equitable remedy is much broader and includes the former.' 5
Stated generally, the doctrine of equitable subrogation may be invoked if the obligation of another is paid by the plaintiff for the pur6
pose of protecting some real or supposed right or interest of his own.1 *
Since subrogation is an equitable doctrine, it cannot be invoked by a
volunteer or intermeddler, or in a case in which the equities of another
party are equal to, or greater than, the plaintiff's1 7 * It is a remedy
which is highly favored and the courts are inclined to extend this doctrine to meet the circumstances of the cases as they arise.1 8
On the assumption that there cannot be another recovery by the injured party against the party legally liable, the possibility of applying
the doctrine in the instant case raises the following questions. Is the
city a volunteer or intermeddler? Have the equities of other parties
intervened?
Obviously the city paid the debt only because of a judgment against
it in favor of the injured party. The city is, therefore, not a volunteer
or stranger under no legal or moral obligation to pay. In making the
payment it acted to discharge a real or supposed legal obligation. It
may be argued that the city should be barred from recovery on the
theory that it was negligent in not appealing the case. The city is not
under a duty to appeal all cases; and, it would prove rather costly for
" Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C. 394, 121 S. E. 662 (1924).
" Central Banking Co. v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 73 W. Va. 197, 80 S. E. 841

(1904).

( * Boney v. Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N; C. 565, 197 S. E.

122 (1937); cf. Frederick v. Insurance Co., 221 N. C. 409, 20 S. E. (2d) 372

(1942) where the court, in applying the law of South Carolina, added to the requirements another element, to wit, that the party paying the .debt must be
secondarily liable.
:7* Wallace v. Benner. 200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795 (1930). The plaintiff
was subrogated to the rights of a first mortgagee and the court refused to deny
the remedy because of the intervening rights of a junior lien holder since the
position of the junior lien holder was not changed by the remedy afforded the
plaintiff; Springs v. Harven, 56 N. C. 97 (1856), where an executor, under a
mistaken idea concerning his power of sale, sold the land to plaintiff and applied
the money to the debts of the deceased. The court refused to let the plaintiff
keep the land, but subrogated him to the rights of the creditors of the deceased,
saying that it would not allow either the plaintiff or the heirs-at-law to profit
from the executor's mistake.
"8Boney v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 213 N. C. 565, 197 S. E. 122 (1937);
Springs v. Harven, 56 N. C. 97 (1856) ; Scott v. Dunn, 21 N. C. 425 (1834);
Note (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 771.
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the city to take all tort cases to a higher court. Neither have the
equities of another party intervened. Thus it seems that the usual requirements for the application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation
have been met.
However, equitable relief is barred if the claimant is guilty of neglect of some positive duty to the defendant. But even if the city should
have been more careful in ascertaining its true liability such neglect
does not seem sufficient to constitute a bar to equitable subrogation. 1 *
It has done the defendant no harm.
The courts have frequently held that a party who pays the debt of
another because of a mistake concerning his own liability will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor if there is some color of obligation.20 This is based upon an equitable theory that the court will in
good conscience not allow the real debtor to take advantage of the mis21
take and misfortune of the plaintiff. *
The courts have tended to extend the doctrine to meet the requirments of equity and good conscience. Where a banking superintendent
advanced money to pay deposits, he was subrogated to the rights of the
bank's creditors. 22 A city official under threat of prosecution paid
23
another's debt to the city. He was given the right of subrogation.
Daughter and husband supported the daughter's parents and were subrogated to the rights of the parents to a lien retained upon the land,
given to a son, to secure an agreement made by the son to support the
parents.2 4 A third party paid and released a lien from the land of
. Detroit Building & Loan Ass'n v. Oram, 200 Mich. 485, 167 N. W. 50
(1918). Plaintiff loaned life tenant money to discharge a lien on the land, taking the land as security. It developed that an abstractor had made a mistake
concerning the tenant's interest, and that actually he did not have that interest in
the land. The court allowed the plaintiff to be subrogated to the lien discharged;
Wallace v. Benner, 200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795 (1930). In giving some exceptions to the doctrine of subrogation said that in order to bar this equitable
remedy the party claiming the relief must be guilty of culpable negligence; Dixon
v. Morgan, 154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. E. 558 (1926). The court said that in order
to bar the remedy of subrogation the plaintiff must be guilty of culpable negligence, defining culpabale negligence as failure to perform a duty owed to another, and not to oneself. Under this definition the city, in the instant case, was
not guilty of culpable negligence in neglecting to prepare its case properly because it owed a duty to no one else.
20 Muir v. Berkshire, 52 Ind. 149 (1875) ; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494 (1879);
Lee v. Newell, 96 Neb. 209, 147 N. W. 684 (1914) ; Journal Pub. Co. v. Barber,
165 N. C. 478, 81 S. E. 694 (1914) ; Walker v. Walker, 138 Tenn. 674, 200 S. W.
825 (1918).
21* Journal Pub. Co. v. -Barber, 165 N. C. 478, 81 S. E. 894 (1914).
For
cases discussing mistake of fact as basis for recovery on theory of implied contract
or unjust enrichment see: Morgan v. Spruill, 214 N. C. 255, 199 S. E. 17 (1938) ;
Sims v. Vick, 151 N. C. 78, 65 S. E. 621 (1909) ; Poole v. Allen, 29 N. C. 120
(1846).
" Lowe v. Robinson, 161 Miss. 585, 137 So. 499 (1931).
"3Avery v. American Surety Co., 260 N. Y. Supp. 828 (1930).
"Vance v. Atherton, 252 Ky. 591, 67 S. W. (2d) 968 (1934).
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another, thinking that he was releasing his own land. He was allowed
25
the right of subrogation.
In the principal case it seems that the rights of other parties would
not be altered if subrogation were allowed, since the property owner
would be given a trial de novo as to his negligence. The injured party
in North Carolina cannot maintain a second suit against the defendant.
Thus it seems that equity should restore the parties to their proper
positions by extending the doctrine of equitable subrogation to this
situation.
JOHN F.

SHuFoRD,
EMmETT PROCTOR.
."Wilder v. Wilder, 75 Vt. 178, 53 Alt. 1072 (1903) ; Schuetz v. Schuetz, 237

Wis. 1, 296 N. W. 70 (1941).

